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Abstrak
Di negara-negara Eropa, banyak diskusi dan perdebatan mengenai komunitas yang berlatar belakang
migrasi. Migran saat ini lebih mampu bersaing dengan penduduk lokal dalam hal mencari pekerjaan
yang lebih baik dan berpartisipasi dalam kegiatan politik di negara-negara Eropa. Hal ini
menimbulkan ketakutan dalam masyarakat 'mainstream' karena diduga dapat mengancam kehidupan
mereka. Momen menarik ini bisa menjadi manfaat bagi partai politik populis untuk mendapatkan
suara dari mayoritas penduduk. Namun, pasca serangan teror 22/7 yang terjadi di Norwegia berhasil
menciptakan ketegangan antara warga lokal dengan mereka yang dianggap 'berlatar belakang
migrasi'. Mengingat, orang-orang yang berlatar belakang migrasi, khususnya komunitas Muslim,
sudah memiliki sejarah panjang migrasi ke Norwegia. Oleh karena itu, pertanyaan penelitian artikel
ini adalah bagaimana komunitas Muslim beradaptasi dengan situasi Populisme di Norwegia. Dengan
menggunakan literatur sejarah dan artikel-artikel penelitian pasca 22/7 menunjukkan bahwa
pendekatan interseksional berguna untuk melihat percampuran aspek kelas, identitas, agama,
kebangsaan, gender, dan etnisitas masyarakat yang terpinggirkan. Kini, para migran ini menghadapi
berbagai diskriminasi. Melakukan protes di ruang publik sebagai cara beradaptasi dengan iklim
populisme menjadi salah satu perjuangan mereka untuk memperoleh hak-hak sebagai warga
(kewargaan) karena pemerintah dinilai gagal mengelola masyarakat yang beragam, terutama dalam
membantu kelompok minoritas. Situasi seperti ini cukup umum terjadi di era populisme yang muncul
di banyak negara yang menargetkan kelompok minoritas sebagai manuver politik untuk mendapat
suara yang besar di kalangan masyarakat 'umum'.

Kata kunci:
populisme, masyarakat Muslim, serangan teror, kewargaan, Norwegia

Abstract
In the European nations, there has been a lot of discussions and arguments regarding the community
who have a ‘migration background’. Migrants nowadays are more capable of competing against local
residents in terms of looking for better employment and participating in the political activities in
European countries. Consequently, it creates fear within ‘mainstream’ society since it is presumably
able to threaten their way of life. This interesting moment can benefit the populist political parties for
gaining voices from the majority population. But, in the aftermath of 22/7 terror attacks in Norway, it
also created tension between locals and those who are considered having a ‘migration background’.
The people who have migration background, especially Muslim community, already has long history
of migration to Norway. Therefore, the research question is how the Muslim community adapt to the
situation of populism in Norway. By using historical literatures and research articles regarding the
aftermath of 22/7 terror attack, it shows that the intersectional approach is useful to see the
intermingled aspects of class, identity, religion, nationality, gender, and ethnicity of marginalised
communities. These migrants now are facing multiple discriminations. Protests in the public sphere
as a way of adapting to the atmosphere of populism are considered as their struggles for citizenship
since the government seems to fail at managing multicultural society, especially advocating the
minority groups. This kind of situation is common in the era of populism emerging in many countries
targeting minority groups as political manoeuvre in order to gain voices among the ‘common’ society.

Keywords:
populism, Muslim community, terror attacks, citizenship, Norway
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INTRODUCTION
Speaking of migration often concerns the people moving in certain regions. This attitude
of migration has been inspired by the growing inequality between Global South and
Global North1 (Bredeloup, 2017, p. 139; N. Kleist, 2017, p. 1). Migration is the
consequence of globalisation, the expansion of trading, and deregulation that have
worsened the living conditions of the countries in Global South (Kleist, 2017, p. 3). It can
also be considered as the migrants’ anxiety to material deprivation and responses of their
own subjectivities when living in the Global South (Haugen, 2017, p. 96). They often
project their better future in new destination countries. Moving to another region seems
to provide ‘hope’ for millions of people to have better employment, exciting life, and
improvement.
Living in new territories, migrants will not only face certain such challenges as
adapting to new environments, learning new languages, following policies enacted by the
government, etc., but they also often find it difficult to integrate to a new kind of socialcultural phenomenon in the new continent. Migrants are especially subjected to different
attitudes from local people (Sopranzetti, 2018, p. 18). The local population often frames
them as fools and excluded from mobility circuits (Kleist, 2017, p. 1). Moreover,
Europeans often perceive those coming from the Orient countries as backwards (Said,
2003, p. 7). These binaries of European hegemony over non-European create an identity
of Europeans as superior compared to the people and cultures outside Europe.
In this paper, I would like to examine some of the issues of migration, especially
regarding migrants coming from Eastern countries. These migrants usually bring cultural
and religious backgrounds that are often considered extremely different from those living
inside Europe. By using the term “racism” brought by Grosfoguel (2011), it becomes
clear that there is a global hierarchy of human superiority/inferiority between the migrants
coming from Global South and Europeans as the representation of the people living in
Global North. Racism can also be marked by colour, language, ethnicity, culture and/or
religion (Grosfoguel et al., 2014, p. 636).
Generally speaking, migration also talks about living in the post-colonial era. By
using the term of “coloniality of power” from Quijano (2000), a sociologist, it is obvious
that the countries in Global North are still living in post-colonial realms, which means
that even after the colonial administrators are already over, the global hierarchies created
by the European colonial expansion, such as the international division of labour (the
division between the core and the periphery) (Mies, 2014, p. 112), Christian-centric,
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patriarchal-hierarchy of gender remain with us here (Grosfoguel et al., 2014, p. 641).
Therefore, it would be significant to see these migrants migrating to metropolitan spaces
in certain countries considered the Global North. They are already contaminated by racial
power relations with a long colonial history (Grosfoguel et al., 2014, p. 641). When these
migrants arrive in certain developed countries, they consequently live in the space of
power relations constituted by coloniality. Even if they are considered formal citizens,
culturally, they are often put at the bottom of urban racial/ethnic hierarchy.
Southeast Asian countries are also important topics, especially when it comes to
discussing Islamic practices. The difference between Muslim community in the Middle
East and Southeast Asia is about the idea of being Muslim. The former is usually
associated with an orthodox and fanatical Islam in general. The latter is considered as the
Sufistic and syncretic idea of Islam. But, the point of which Islam is being imagined as
“harmful” religious ideology is presumably because of the tragedy of 9/11 or September
11 that already constructed “harmful” image towards Islamic movement around the globe.
Importantly, Muslim living in the Southeast Asian countries is considered contributors to
the ‘second front’ in the global ‘war on terrorism’ (Conboy, 2006). It can not be separated
from the tragedy of the Bali bombing in 2002 (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 1). Therefore,
Southeast Asian countries have become an important topic of Muslim community,
especially the diasporic one living in such Global North as Norway. It needs to be
explored further to see the reaction of the local population against the Muslim community.
One of the reasons why Norway is such an important topic is because of the
tragedy that happened on 22/7 or July 22nd, 2011. There was a terrorist attack on minority
groups of Muslims. It also became headline news on the international media such as
Aljazeera and The Washington Times. A report by Aljazeera (2021) entitled, “Norway
marks decade since Andre Breivik killed 77 people”, reported on how the government
responded to that tragedy by holding commemorations of 77 people who were killed by
Andre Breivik. It is also considered to be the worst tragedy of violence after World War
II. Keyton & Lewis (2021) from The Washington Times, also reported the same event of
commemorations held by the government of Norway. Norway’s King Harald said that
this moment is called “the dark forces” in society. That is the reason why this paper
expects to reveal about the paradoxes of the welfare state; a country that is considered as
a wealthy nation, but still have the complexity of issues in terms of managing diversity.
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Populism is a term that suits this current topic, especially as the rise of populist
parties is considered to be a global phenomenon nowadays. They often direct emotional
narratives toward their citizens to gain political powers. Anger, fear, and pride could also
be tools for manoeuvring politics according to parties’ interests. It can also be imagined
as ‘perfect nationalism’ that creates tensions and social antagonism between ‘us’ and
‘them’ (Agius et al., 2020, p. 433). Consequently, it could negatively impact the
(im)migrants who are considered to be ‘them’, not ‘us’. Since the populism arises, it is
followed by certain political-sentimental movements based on the local citizenship, such
as anti-immigrant, xenophobic, anti-Muslim, etc.
Since migrants with such negative-stereotypical religious background as Islam
exist across the globe, they are often perceived as not contributing to gender equality
which is always important for European, and Nordic countries in particular, to fight for.
But, interestingly, this Muslim community has a long history of living in European
countries such as Norway. Indeed, there have been cultural contacts and exchanges
between the migrants and the local population. So, it is too naive to only the populism
without looking into the history of the Muslim community living in Norway for a long
time. Therefore, the research question in this paper is ‘How does the Muslim minority
group adapt to the situation amid populism in Norway?’ This paper does literature studies
related to this topic of Islamic community in European countries to answer it. This paper
expects to reveal how migration of Muslims from the Middle East and Southeast Asia
becomes such a threat toward the local population, especially in the atmosphere of
populism inspired by the extreme political right-wing parties nowadays.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The Politics of Fear: The Rise of Populism of Right-Wing Political Parties
This current issue seems to be different compared to common migration studies.
Migrants all over the world are commonly known as having difficult situations in terms
of their living conditions. However, when it comes to talking about populism, it can be
considered a reverse phenomenon of migration. It means that the local population or the
local citizens have the anxiety of facing migrants who have the ability to compete with
them. In Slavoj Žižek’s article entitled Against the Populist Temptation (2006), it
becomes clear that populism is considered as a reverse phenomenon regarding issues of
migration taking place in many parts of the world.
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Žižek (2006, p. 553) cited Hegel’s term of gegensätzliche Bestimmung or
oppositional determination, which means that there are particular ‘democratic’ demands,
such as better social security, healthcare, fair taxes, and so on, among its universal
political subjects. In this regard, ‘People’ become a universal political subject, which
means that these people bring all different particular struggles and antagonisms that
separate between ‘us’ (‘people’) and ‘them’ (outside the ‘people’). In some ways, it can
also be the struggles of the workers (local citizens) who feel threatened by the coming
migrants that will take over their employment. In his book, The Precariat: The New
Dangerous Class (2011), Guy Standing showed one of the examples that the immigrants
were able to take over the local’s employment. In the city of Prato, Italy, there had been
a great manufacturing centre of textiles and garments. It was able to absorb many local
residents of Italy. However, in 1989, this city started to recognise the migrants coming
from China. From 2008 to 2010, the Chinese firms continued to grow while the Indians
and Bangladeshis started to buffet local Italian firms as they were drowned into
precarious jobs (Standing, 2011, p. 4). These former workers of local residents were
living in fear and insecurity toward their employment. As Standing put it,
“There is much larger element living in fear and security . . . that does not make
them any less part of the precariat. They are floating, rudderless, and potentially
angry, capable of veering to the extreme right of extreme left politically and
backing populist demagoguery that plays on their fears and phobias” (Standing,
2011, p. 4).
From the economic perspective, the local people of Italy are threatened by the
coming migrants who can take over their employment in their own country. However,
this moment would be a great opportunity for the political elite to take advantage of them
by enacting populist policies. One of the popular political elites, Prime Minister Silvio
Berlusconi, was considered as a political elite enacting such populist policies. From the
1950s through 1980s, there were stagnating incomes, inequality, and economic crises in
general (Agnew & Shin, 2017, p. 916). From that moment, Berlusconi and his party,
Forza Italia, were constituting populism by presenting himself as a “man of providence”
(Agnew & Shin, 2017, p. 921). By 2009, populist political movements and the way
Berlusconi made populism by ‘taking politics to the people’ and making an opposition
towards immigrants became more popular (Diadato & Niglia 2019, p. 27).
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From the case above, populism negative sentiments go against ‘the outsiders’ or
those who are considered as “them”, not “us” as the real representation of “the people”.
It can also be the reflection of the anti-globalisation movement. However, antiglobalisation, anti-immigrants, racial movements, and so on, can not simply be dubbed
populism since the populism itself requires ‘ideal struggle of the people’ (Žižek, 2006,
p. 560). One thing for sure from the case of Italy, populism occurring in Europe can also
be criticised that,
“. . . the reaction of “official” Europe was one of near-panic at the dangerous,
“irrational”, racist, and isolationist passions that sustained the no, at a parochial
rejection of openness and liberal multiculturalism” (Žižek, 2006, p. 552).
Another example of the rise of populism can also occur closer to home. We can
find from the article written by Hatib Abdul Kadir entitled “Muslim-Christian
Polarisation in the Post-Conflict Society-Ambon (2013) the historical trajectories of
religious polarisation by the changing government regimes from colonial to New Order
period. I found it useful to see the reason behind the idea of populism that can be
considered, in addition to only mobilising or accommodating certain groups, not all of
the groups within society. From the case of Ambon, we can find that the Christian
community as native Ambonese had better access to education, sanitation, and political
system during the Dutch-colonial period compared to Muslim as migrants or non-native
Ambonese (Kadir, 2013, p. 825). However, during New Order regime, the political
dynamics in the city of Ambon started to change, indicated by the emergence of the
Muslim middle-class who also participated in the regional political government,
consequently weakening the Christian-political parties. It eventually created tension
between native Christian-Ambonese and Muslim-Ambonese (Kadir, 2013, pp. 830–
831).
As Muslim-Ambonese minority groups were gaining political power, it could
provoke clash and dispute among different religious backgrounds in the city of Ambon.
The jealousy of the Christian community could lead to political manoeuvring of those
wanting to take advantage of their emotion. Indeed, it happened after decentralisation in
Indonesia which provided the local wisdom and power back to Christian community as
native Ambonese. But it also created a dilemma; it created conflicts and exclusion for
the migrant groups. Such provocation was due to decentralisation which in fact triggered
fears of Islamisation, not redressed the past injustices towards Moluccan Muslims in
265
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general (Bertrand, 2002, p. 73). Therefore, the decentralisation not only gained back the
local residents' power but also intensified tense relations between the Christian and
Muslim communities.
When it comes to participation in political activities, Norway has already
provided

possibilities for minority groups to democratically participate in the

parliament. For instance, Mariam Hussein is considered as the first Somali elected into
Norwegian parliament (The Christian Science, 2021). Unlike in the United States, this
phenomenon of minorities participating in political activities is relatively new in
Norway. At the same time, however, anti-immigrant populist parties also still have their
electoral gains. That is the reason behind political tension between diverse ‘mainstream’
political parties since politicians with ‘migration backgrounds’ who can participate in
the parliament are evidence of a subtle shift in what it means to be Norwegian and
challenging the notions of the multicultural society.
As depicted in both cases, the very definition of the term ‘populism’ is not
specific enough if it is only to see the struggles of ‘the people’ for hegemony. Firstly,
Žižek pointed out that one of Ernesto Laclau’s works on populism only explains the
struggle for hegemony based on Laclau’s case of solidarnosc (a trade union in Poland
established on September 17, 1980). But, the cases from Italy and the city of Ambon
seem to be missed by the Laclau. Therefore, populism could also mean that the rise of
populist ideas is not only class-based but also identity-based, such as local residents
versus (im)migrants and/or Muslim versus Christian, and so on.
So, one crucial point of populism, according to Žižek (2006, p. 555), is that this
trend can displace antagonism and construct the enemy. Populism, for Žižek, is another
way to externalise the enemy in order to gain a balance and justice within society. The
economy system of the enemy is then tried to be disturbed by the particular actors,
usually considered as political elites, by abusing their power to gain control over them.
It means that this idea of populism is based on the motive of “abusing power” by
speculative groups of the ruling class. It also never considers that the economic system
is flawed, but because of,
“the intruder who corrupted it (financial manipulators, not necessarily capitalists,
and so on); not a fatal flaw inscribed into the structure as such but an element
that doesn’t play its role within the structure properly” (Žižek, 2006, p. 555).
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Therefore, it would be too complicated to solve populism by going back to
deeper solidarity between Right-wing and Left-wing parties or going further into a
totalitarian one (Žižek, 2006, p. 555). However, populism now and then may occur in
right-wing political parties and also the left ones. The article written by Agius et al.
(2020, p. 434) showed that populism can be divided into two views. For those coming
from left-wing political parties, it is considered class-based, while for those coming from
the right-wing, populism is considered identity-based and much more exclusive.
However, for Žižek (2006, p. 554), both parties have the same ideological concern, that
is, the class struggle for hegemony. The struggle can be in any form as long as it is
“transubstantiated” into the manifestation of universal ideal, which means that there is
particular demand representing contingent struggles for the hegemony or politicaleconomic dynamics taking place in the current society. Therefore, this struggle also can
be considered as a way of self-reconciling the society.
In Norway's case, there was terrorist attack by Anders Behring Breivik on
Norwegian soil on July 22, 2011 or called 22/7. The assailant presumably was a whiteright-wing extremist Norwegian that resulted from the tensions targeting minority
groups based on their nationality, skin colour, ethnicities, and religion (Bangstad,
2017a). It would be interesting to see the rise of populist right-wing, namely, Progress
Party, as an example of a political party that can create such local sentiments toward
outsiders. Indeed, it did not happen in Norway only, but the mainstreaming of racism
and Islamophobia was accompanied by Donald Trump's rise during U.S. election
(Bangstad, 2017a).
Progress Party delegates called for enacting such policies targeting religious
minority groups in Norway. These policies, such as restriction of wearing hijab or
Islamic headscarf for girls under sixteen in public schools, have increased state control
in the mosques under the pretext of preventing “radicalisation”, and the restriction of
circumcision of male children (Bangstad, 2017b). It is interesting to see that political
parties such as the populist right-wing party in Norway took this momentum as their
political agendas toward the outsiders, that is, the Muslim minority group. Meanwhile,
this far-right populist party also has the motive of the ideals of democratic consideration
in secularisation by creating the politics of fear among its citizens. This kind of situation
needs to be taken into consideration regarding how a far-right-wing party is coming to
emerge in an age of populism.
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Intersectionality is a useful concept to see the complexity of social world
organised by not only single axis of social division such as gender, but also race,
ethnicity, class, religion, caste, and any other social aspects (Collins & Bilge 2016, p.
2). People usually use intersectionality as an analytical tool to address a wide range of
topics of social problems. However, the case in Norway is more targeting Muslim
women who face multiple discrimination.
Discrimination is also associated with the problem of citizenship. It means that
Muslim women face inequality of rights, especially when looking for employment in the
atmosphere of populism in Norway. It is challenging for them since they face various
discrimination based on their gender, race, ethnicity, and religion. Therefore, on one
hand, intersectionality could mean multiple combinations of gender, race, religion, etc.,
that shape individual identities in this multicultural society. However, it can also be
multiple suppression experienced by individuals, particularly Muslim women living in
Norway. Hence, I might argue that intersectionality usually occurs in diverse societies,
and it can also be a problem if there is discrimination within society. So, intersectionality
can be a useful analytical tool to see the multiple or varied aspects of the social division
of class, gender, race, religion, and others in order to see the reality of unequal rights
taking place in a given society.
This case of populism also does not only happen in one of the Nordic countries
but also in certain areas. For example, an article written by Heli Askola, entitled “Wind
from the North, don’t go forth? Gender equality and the rise of the populist nationalism
in Finland” (2019), showed one of the Nordic countries, Finland, also has been seeing
the growing support for populist-nationalist parties and anti-immigrant movements since
1990s. These anti-immigration movements have become more prevalent nowadays,
especially targeting the people who bring such cultural and religious backgrounds as
Islam.
Islam as a religion is commonly perceived as not supporting gender equality,
while most of the Nordic countries, conversely, have long traditions of promoting gender
equality. Therefore, the discourse of gender equality may become a political manoeuvre
for extreme right-wing populist parties in Nordic countries where this discourse is
strongly accepted by the mainstream society (Askola, 2019, p. 56). Bringing this
political discourse is to bring public debate that is driven by the fears among the majority
groups and also can be threatening their way of life (Petersen & Schramm, 2017, p. 6).
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RESEARCH METHOD
Using the historical approach, we can understand the historical trajectories and the early
generations of migrants coming to Global North, especially Norway, as their destination
to make a better living. Historical approach means involving careful study and analysis of
data regarding past events. So, it can gain a clearer understanding of the impact of the past
on the present. The intersectional approach is used to demonstrate the interwoven aspects
of class, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and gender to get a sense of the people who have
been marginalised (Crenshaw, 1989). The intersectional approach is used to understand
the process of subordination experienced by women who have ‘migration background’
along with their distinct identity within multicultural society amid populism. This
approach is a useful analytical tool in that every reading materials use it to analyse the
complexity of social aspects, especially targeting marginal community or minority group
if they experience unequal treatments within society. Therefore, some of the literature
reviews would be framed by this theoretical framework of intersectionality to divide
between naturalised male and female Muslims with “migration background.” Secondary
data, such as historical archives and news media, were also collected, especially from the
news media currently discussing the political dynamics in Norway. Explaining the
historical trajectories of Muslim migrants coming to Norway is important since there has
been discrimination according to socio-spatial arrangements. For instance, in the 198090s, there was a growing fear of terrorism, especially in Oslo, so the government shifted
the migrant settlement to the valley located outside of the city (Andersen & Biseth, 2013).
It shows that the problems of migrants have a long history that has never been resolved
until this day. Hence, the historical approach becomes a pivotal aspect to see the
chronological process of discrimination toward migrants.
DISCUSSION
Brief History of the Middle East Migration to Norway
The people from the Middle East, such as Pakistan, Morocco, and Turkey have a long
history of migration to certain countries in Europe, such as Czech Republic, Sweden,
Poland, and Norway (Bell & Strabac 2021, p. 6). Norway, especially, becomes the primary
topic of this research to observe the attitude of ‘mainstream society’ of Norway towards
the Muslim minority group. This topic would be interesting to understand the cultural
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dynamics between the migrants and Norwegians who often see themselves holding
different worldviews.
Norway has a long history of interacting with Muslim migrants. The population of
Norway has reached 4,7 million in 2007 (Oslo Kommune, 2007, p. 40). Meanwhile,
immigrants in the capital of Oslo hold 23,8% of the population (Vestel, 2009, p. 469). In
the 1960s, the first Muslim workers mainly came from the Middle East (Bell & Strabac
2021, p. 6). Around 1970s, Norway began indicating that the first and largest group of
immigrants were from Pakistan (Vestel, 2009, p. 469). However, in the 1980s, there was
a growing threat of terrorism globally and an intensified suspicion toward Islam. The
editors of newspapers had chosen terrorism in the Middle East as the main topic
(Chomsky, 2017, p. 29). This kind of situation has given negative stigma for Muslims
living in Norway as a threat.
Then, in the 1990s, the government decided to relocate immigrants from the capital
of Oslo (inner-city) to Grorud Valley or sub-urban areas (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 7).
This valley used to be rural until the 1950s, Norway's industry and blue-collar workers had
dominated in this area (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 7). Indeed, moving immigrants to this
valley would eventually create tensions between the two that belong to the (lower)
working-class. This area is then described as a ghetto, a term attached to a segregated area.
Then, the immigrants were not part of the larger society but deviated from the dominant
ways of life and values of Norway's ‘mainstream society’ (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p.
18). In 1993, this valley was only inhabited by around 25% of immigrants. However, in
1998, 50% of the population was immigrants (Vestel, 2009, p. 470).
The negative attitude toward Muslims was exacerbated after September 11th, 2001
(9/11) tragedy. The 9/11 tragedy changed the entire worldviews on how to treat Islam as
radical belief and that the world had to fight against terrorism (Chomsky, 2017, pp. 20–
22). At the same time, the U.S. foreign policy on the tragedy triggered important public
discussion since it had contributed to creating the world of terrors (Butler, 2004, p. 3). This
attitude has affected not only Pakistani immigrants in Norway, but also directed against
Muslims in general.
The 9/11 tragedy was followed by the Israeli invasion of Gaza that triggered the
demonstrations in the capital of Norway, Oslo, in 2008 (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 5).
Many young people from Grorud Valley joined in these protests. The highest or climactic
point of the demonstrations was situated in Oslo. There were clashes between youth and
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the police, marked by the vandalisation of stores by youth with immigrant backgrounds on
January 8, 2009 (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 6). After the incident, the right-wing populist
Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet / FrP or PP), made a statement that these young people
were claimed as incompatible to follow “Western values” and it would be catastrophic for
social integration (Andersen & Biseth, 2013, p. 5).
The terrorist attack on July 22, 2011 by Anders Behring Breivik, who was
considered a supporter of the extreme right-wing Progress Party, created tension between
mainstream society/local citizens and the Muslim community. He was an anti-Muslim
crusader and said that his motives were fighting against an Islamic takeover or
‘Islamisation.’ He also targeted the European governments who support multiculturalism,
which he saw as a threat for Europe, ‘Western values and culture” (Wiggen, 2012, pp.
585–586). This situation then stimulated the local sentiments toward the minority group
with “migration background.” For instance, those from the Middle East were targeted with
ethnic labelling by Norwegians in schools. Racism based on the migrant appearance with
minority status becomes prevalent in today’s Norway; dark skin, religious symbols like
wearing hijab2, showing cultural difference within mainstream Norwegians could result in
an exclusion from the mainstream group (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 49).
One of the articles written by Sindre Bangstad entitled “Norwegian Right-Wing
Discourses: Extremism Post-Utøya (2016) examined the lives of the Norwegians after the
terror attacks. Actually, Breivik was a member of the Progress Party. He was inspired by
certain books, such as Bruce Bawer’s regarding the term of ‘Eurabia,’ which means the
vision of European countries as a multicultural society with equal citizenship rights for
their residents. At the same time, the Islamic communities are considered ‘quislings’ (not
respecting citizenship rights) and the politicians who support an immigration policy were
considered traitors (Bangstad, 2016, pp. 235–236). Breivik’s actions also gained a lot of
attention and sympathies among extreme and populist political right-wing parties. His
actions targeted social democrat parties instead of the Muslim community to deliver clear
messages about the future threat of Muslim community invasion in Europe (Bangstad,
2016, p. 236). Therefore, Bangstad defines Progress Party and Breivik’s actions as
intersections between populist/radical and extreme political right-wing because of their
political methods to make great transformations for their political interests.
“populist/radical right accepts democratic rules, directly refuses the use of violence
to accomplish what it considers its main political goals, and works within the
parliamentary political system; on the other hand, by contrast, the extreme right or
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Far Right movements and groups do not recognise the existing institutions and
political system as legitimate and are willing to make use of radical and violent and
means in order to accomplish political transformations” (Bangstad, 2016, p. 234).
Interestingly, news media, journalists, and politicians of Norway had reported that
the tragedy was due to Muslim terrorism. As stated by Helge Lurås, a Norway politician,
“though it need not be an organised group with an international agenda. It might also be a
local group of [Muslim] immigrants hostile to Norwegian society” (Gardell, 2014, p. 130).
However, it turned out that the terrorist was not a Muslim, but a Norwegian-Christian. The
terror attack, on the contrary, was also creating fear over the local residents because of the
‘narrative discourse’ constructed by Breivik targeting Muslim groups living in the
European countries in general. He intended to protect the Nordic race from Muslim groups
coming from the Middle East in particular. Therefore, he is considered more a fascist (neoNazi movements) than attempting to counter Jihad movements or raise anti-Islam
sentiments within Norway's ‘mainstream society’ (Bjørgo & Gjelvsik 2017, p. 5).
In the aftermath of 22/7, it was quite challenging for the Muslim community living
in Norway, especially when participating in the public sphere or simply applying for
employment. An article in The Atlantic written by Schultheis (2017) showed that Progress
Party was the third-largest political party and relatively successful in 2017. This party is
concerned with the immigration issues because of the growing xenophobia and the
statements from many FrP’s politicians about the alleged Islamisation of Norwegian
society (Jupskås, 2015, p. 68). Given this challenging situation, it would be interesting to
see through the eyes of the Muslim community in order to see how they adapt to this kind
of atmosphere of populism taking place in Norway.
Adapting to the Atmosphere of Populism
Niklas Jakobsson and Svein Blom (2014) examined the aftermath of terror attacks in
Norway's two cities, namely, Utøya and Oslo. They argued that there is more scepticism
toward migrants. In addition, there are also growing preferences for immigration policy
and prejudices toward these migrants across European-Union (EU) countries. For instance,
there was a smaller attack towards these Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands (Jakobsson
& Blom, 2014, p. 2) that could increase the local sentiments of anti-Muslim discrimination.
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This case of terrorism is not a “usual” case that often targets random citizens but
instead targets the ruling elites of democratic party representation. So, it can be considered
different compared to other cases of terrorism. After the terrorist attacks, it consequently
had a severe impact on ethnic-religious minority groups, particularly the Muslim
community. The government, especially the Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg,
received praises from the media on how he responded and overcame the crisis (Jakobsson
& Blom, 2014, p. 3). However, this response may only provide temporary relief among
people. Jakobsson and Blom’s statistical findings on the Norwegian in response to the
terror attacks shows that the attitudes of Norwegians toward immigrants are posit
Norwegians conduct no repressive act. However, the terror was still able to increase the
conservatism and scepticism toward immigrants. In addition, even though the
government’s reactions brought positive sentiments among the people, the terror attacks
still left a long-term impact on attitudes and voting behaviour within the society of
Norway.
Significantly, there is growing public debate in the news media regarding the
Muslim community as a threat to European society. The terror attacks by Breivik
successfully changes the perception in the mainstream and online media toward minority
groups. The media increases anti-Islamic criticism and some of them, who are considered
anti-Muslim, feel as victims for not having voices in the mainstream media. They often
use online platforms to continue delivering their messages about the growing fear of
‘Islamisation’ in Norway (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014, p. 436). This anti-Islamic digital
movement has also been supported by the Progress Party and other anti-Islamic
movements throughout the globe talking about the similar issue regarding the crisis in
Norway (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014, p. 436). Therefore, it could actually exacerbate the
tension between the ‘mainstream society’ and the people with ‘migration background’.
An article written by Mette Wiggen (2012) examined the situation in two cities of
Norway a year after the terror attacks. Interestingly, there was a direct response to the
tragedy from national and international media and academia. The attack was assumed to
be the work of Muslim terrorist. Wiggen did a quick interview with the onlookers in the
streets not far from the scene, and the onlookers immediately claimed that the assailant of
the mass killing was surely from the Muslim community. Wiggen (2012, p. 586) informed
that two hijab-ed girls in Oslo had been attacked verbally, and a young boy of PakistaniNorwegian descent was thrown off public transport in the same area.
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I argue that Breivik’s idea is prevalent within the mainstream society of Norway
and in the rest of Europe. Additionally, regardless of their differences, mainstream political
parties, the Progress Party (as the representative of the right-wing party) and the Labour
Party (as the representative of the left-wing party), tend to condemn immigrant’s way of
life. Therefore, the term populism is not limited to certain political parties. It can be both
from the right-wing and left-wing political parties. However, the former seems to be the
most xenophobic and anti-immigration party, although the latter is not significantly
different (Wiggen, 2012, p. 586). Therefore, the attacks by Breivik are seen as attacking
mainstream Norwegian values, openness, and democracy. The Prime Minister of Norway,
Jens Stoltenberg, surprisingly refused to point the finger at any political party. He only
said how Norway had handled the tragedy and urged the citizens to protect Norwegian
values of openness and democracy. But, Wiggen puts it,
“Norwegian love, tolerance, and understanding did not stretch to embrace one of
Europe’s most persecuted groups, and politicians from all three governing parties
were busy showing their support for the Norwegian public . . . “(Wiggen, 2012, p.
588).
Figure 1 Residents took part on flower-parade for commemorating the tragedy, four days
after the attacks, reclaiming in the ’city’s public access in Oslo

Source: Harpviken (2021).

The 22/7 attacks inevitably drive ethnic stigmatisation toward young immigrants
and their descendants in the educational system. Katrine Fangen and Brit Lynnebakke
(2014), provided interesting insight on how the government declares official statements
calling for integration and tolerance toward immigrants and the people who have a
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“migration background.” According to Fangen & Lynneblake (2014, p. 48), the Norway
educational system is generally built upon hierarchies, which means the disciples are
divided into two categories, namely, for those who have a good performance and those
who do not, and also for those who get involved in particular social circles and those who
do not. These categorisations are made to focus on the experiences of stigmatisation in the
aftermath of the attacks by Breivik which might be associated with minority ethnic group
prejudices (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 48).
These young immigrants have some coping strategies on how to deal with the
stigmatisation. Male and female minority groups with “migration background” have
different coping mechanisms when interacting with ethnic Norwegians. Female minority
groups tend to avoid contact or withdraw from making conversation with the Norwegians
to avoid being stigmatised (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 52). The male ones also take
withdrawal mechanisms and frequently make conversation only with the same
background.
However, when it comes to working harder, males and females from minority
groups are treated differently by their teachers. Male Muslims are also not treated equally,
especially when looking for employment. The young Muslims with “migration
background” can only access certain employment opportunities. When they try to open
another field of employment, they would strongly be rejected by the company (Fangen &
Lynneblake, 2014, p. 53). The female Muslims are much worse. They tend to be working
harder and requiring something extra in order to gain equal opportunities as people from
majority groups (Fangen & Lynneblake, 2014, p. 53). Hence, female Muslims experience
multiple discriminations, such as their religious identity as Muslims, gender, and also their
“migration/immigrant background.” These cultural difference endorses the process of
victimisation of immigrant women since Muslim women are usually seen as “problems of
culture” taken from violence and male dominance in their own culture (Wiggen, 2012, pp.
586–587). Therefore, even though the majority often discriminates Muslim men, they still
have more opportunities to access resources than Muslim women. From this case, we can
see that religious identity, gender, and identity of migrants (as minority groups or
ethnicities) have prominent roles in contributing to the interwoven aspects of
discriminations, making Muslim female migrants often difficult to participate in public
sphere (such as looking for employment).
Good illustration on how the Muslim community, especially women, faces
multiple discrimination in looking for employment and jobs in European countries such as
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Norway, has been written by Valentina Di Stasio and Edvard N. Larsen (2020) in their
article about hiring discrimination in the European labour markets. Generally speaking,
gender and race are the primary issues in everyday life. Basically, people considered as
whites are the dominant groups in European societies. Nevertheless, there is discrimination
between white men and women, and the latter tend to be discriminated against when it
comes to looking for employment. Worse yet, people considered as the skin of colour,
such as non-white women, would experience multiple discrimination based on their
gender, race, ethnic and religious identities when looking for jobs in European labour
markets (Di Stasio & Larsen, 2020, p. 233). For instance, Middle Easterner bringing
Islamic background might be perceived as more threatening than Asian men in the
employment context (Di Stasio & Larsen, 2020, p. 236). Therefore, intersectional
approaches become a sharp analysis to study inequality, especially in Norway as one of
the Nordic and European countries amid populism.
Racism towards people from the third-world, especially Muslims, is also prevalent
daily in Norway. Bjoernaas (2015) gave vivid details of his experiences facing racist
statements and discrimination from her friends in school until she worked in the office.
She also told the story when she experienced living under politicians of the Progress Party
who used to have plans to ban the veil in the public sphere (Bjoernaas, 2015, p. 83). In
post-9/11, the ostensible oppression of Muslim women wearing the veil is more obvious.
Siv Jensen, a leader of Progress Party, sees Muslim women as passive victims of men and
religion (Bjoernaas, 2015, p. 87). She sees that Muslim women have been oppressed and
subjugated by Muslim men and their own religion. Interestingly, Bjoernaas criticised that
race, religion, and gender as having roles in oppressing Muslim women. In addition,
Bjoernaas also told that her friends used to call her pakkis (Pakistani), jevla Muslim
(fucking Muslim), and neger (nigger). It shows that Muslim women face multiple
oppressions and discriminations. They have intersectionally been discriminated by
interwoven aspects of gender, race, religion, and ethnicity for coming from the third-world.
This depiction also finds that Muslim women had already faced discrimination in daily life
prior to the tragedy of terror attacks and any other populist agenda.
There are still few scholars who do research on Muslim migrants coming from
Southeast Asia. Interestingly, Southeast Asia has been the primary region heavily
influenced by the Islamic mode of life. The countries in Southeast Asia also have
significant contributions when it comes to discussing the Muslim community. There are
276

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 23(2)

two nations considered Muslim majority nations in Southeast Asia, namely, Indonesia and
Malaysia (Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 1). In this era of globalisation, there is a term of
‘transnational’ Islamic movements meaning that the Islamic community at the
transnational level incorporates with the local Muslim community in certain regions
(Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 254). Sometimes, it also brings about tension between the local
Muslim community and the transnational movement. Even though, this kind of
phenomenon can also be considered the process of democratisation of Islamic politics
(Miichi & Farouk, 2015, p. 255). This process is also the reason behind the emergence of
fear among European countries, such as Norway, when looking at the expansion of Islamic
movements in political activities.
Approximately 87.2 per cent of the Indonesian population are Muslims (Hefner,
2017, p. 91). Around thousands of them are emigrants and live in Norway, mainly in urban
areas such as Oslo (Armenia, 2020). Few social researchers discuss the topic of immigrants
coming from Asia, especially Southeast Asia where the Muslim community continues to
bloom exponentially. Southeast Asian countries have a lot of Muslim communities with
varied historical backgrounds, especially Indonesia, which is considered a country with a
long history of dealing with diverse communities. However, there are countries with the
Muslim community as a minority group, such as the Philippines, Myanmar, and Thailand
(Miichi & Farouk 2015, pp. 1, 145), but generally, Muslim communities spread evenly in
the Southeast Asia region.
The difference between Muslims from the Middle East and Southeast Asian
countries is on their understanding of Islamic teachings. The first is usually considered
‘radical’ as they adhere to their religion strictly. The latter is considered syncretic since
Islamic teachings in the region have blended with various ideas of beliefs surrounding it.
Muslims of Southeast Asia can also be considered as ‘moderate’ in which the word
‘moderate’ is usually a label in opposition to terrorism or ‘radical’ (Van Es, 2021, p. 174).
Therefore, Muslims of Southeast Asia are more adaptable to the current situation.
Nevertheless, migrants coming from Southeast Asia still face discrimination like those
from the Middle East.
One of the articles written by Levi Geir Eidhamar (2018) about comparison
between Muslim-majority Indonesia and minority group of Muslim living in Norway
showed that there is a difference in how Muslim men treat their own wives. Interestingly,
when it comes to wife-beating attitudes, Indonesia and Norway have a similar term of
barada, which means doing “physical discipline’ to women/wives (Eidhamar, 2018, p.
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243). This term seems common among mainstream Muslims whether in Indonesia or
Norway. In dealing with the authority and the patriarchal structures, most of the Indonesian
women interviewed by him said that they opposed the idea of patriarchal Islamic structure.
However, they considered themselves as cultural Muslims without following several
principles of patriarchal doctrines. From this article, I argue that the Muslims in the two
different countries still hold the same meaning of patriarchal structure. However, the
difference is that in Norway, the Islamic norms frequently promote gender equality and
fight against wife-beating. Nevertheless, it still shows that Muslims in both countries is
deeply grounded in male dominance.
Di Stasio et al. (2021) examined the discrimination towards minority group of
Muslims when looking for employment in the aftermath of 22/7 tragedy. Muslim
community is considered to be in the marginal position in the mainstream society of
Norway. In their study, (Di Stasio et al., 2021, p. 1306, 1318) tested the economic aspect
of Muslim migrants coming from diverse countries, including Indonesia, in which these
migrants try to apply for jobs in Norway. Their paper expected to reveal religious, racial,
and gender discrimination experienced by the Muslim migrants when applying for jobs.
For instance, the people considered as White-Muslim have a bigger chance in employment
than Muslim women from Southeast Asia (Indonesia) and Africa. They mostly have a
severe impact of unemployment (Di Stasio et al., 2021, p. 1308). In short, these Muslim
migrants have multiple discrimination (Muslim, skin of colour, and gender). Therefore,
Indonesian Muslim migrants with the rest of the Muslim communities from other countries
living in Norway are now facing the same severe discrimination when applying for jobs in
this situation of populism in Norway.
Adapting to this situation of populism often voiced by Progress Party (Bjoernaas,
2015), Muslims did not just stay silent. They held a public protest on August 25th, 2014
regarding the Norwegian history against the acts of terrorism and human rights violations
committed on behalf of Islam (Van Es, 2021, p. 170). Van Es showed how Norwegian
Muslims, regardless of their ‘migration background’ or assimilation, want to express their
feelings of being marginalised by the authority. Van Es (2021, p. 171) focused on both
protests, namely, the protest march against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and the
‘Ring of Peace’ around the synagogue of Oslo. Interestingly, the protests involved both
Muslims and non-Muslims. As a Dutch Muslim, van Es also participated in the protests
fighting for ‘good citizenship’ for Muslims in European countries. Muslim community
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needs to be ‘moderate’ when it comes to Islam practices, so they can be accepted by
‘Norwegian’ values, such as gender equality, democracy, and respect for fundamental
human rights (Van Es, 2021, p. 174)
In the aftermath of 22/7 terror attack, the protests would certainly empower the
minority groups to have courage in expressing their feelings toward unequal treatments
when generally living in European countries. They have to show their identity of Islam as
a religion, putting humanity first above everything. By protesting against extremist
Muslims, it is clear that not all Muslims support such violence (Van Es, 2021, p. 170).
Besides, protests could also be seen as their limited participation in the public sphere. In
addition, an article from The Guardian written by Bangstad (2019) entitled, “Norway is in
denial about the threat of far-right violence”, showed the institutional failure associated
with the atrocity, and also the director of far-right Oslo-based Human Rights Service
(HRS), Hege Storhaug, allegedly pushed analogies between Islam and Nazism and the
spread of conspiracy theories of “Eurabia.” In 2019, there was also the following attack by
Phillip Manshaus (inspired by Breivik) targeting mosque in Bærum (Brandvold, 2019; U.
S. Department of State, 2021). It made Islamic community feel even more disappointed
toward the government. Hence, adapting to this situation is more likely to be challenging
for Muslims to have a better bargaining position of power to gain equal treatment as
citizens. However, after these subsequent tragedies targeting Islamic groups, orchestrating
hatred for years, it could also open up the possibility of the Norwegian government getting
the message for the voters in the future.
CONCLUSION
Migration concerns people who move to other places and all the problems that come with
it as well. Migrants from the Global South migrate to developed countries such as Norway
to find better living conditions. They used to be seen as ‘second class citizen’. However,
now, they seem to be able to compete with local people or natives in terms of participating
in the public space (employment) and political activities. It makes the locals feel
threatened when their life has to change with the migrants. Political elites exploit the state
of affairs with their populist agenda to gain votes. Discrimination against the migrants by
the right-wing political parties of Norway is considered successful.
Moreover, the discrimination has been exacerbated in the aftermath of the terror
attacks. Those who are considered minority groups of Muslim face multiple
discrimination in public schools and apply for employment in Norway. The intersectional
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approach is useful to see the interwoven aspects of class, identity, religion, nationality,
gender, and ethnicity of marginalised communities. In the aftermath of the terror attacks,
migrants from Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, also face multiple discrimination,
certainly when they apply for jobs or employment. Carrying out protests in the public
sphere to adapt to the atmosphere of populism can also mean that they fight for ‘good
citizenship’ in Norway. They also seem to be neglected by the government since the
government has to manage its own political interest in the multicultural society. This kind
of situation happens quite commonly in the era of populism emerging in many countries
targeting minority groups as political manoeuvres in order to gain support among
mainstream society.
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